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John Jay 
First chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court
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Resumo
O presente artigo tem o objetivo de analisar o federalismo 
no Poder Judiciário dos Estados Unidos. Para isso, realiza 
uma comparação entre as competências e a autonomia das 
cortes estaduais e federais, concluindo que o modelo ado-
tado no Judiciário é muito parecido com aquele seguido no 
âmbito executivo e legislativo. Analisa, ainda, o fenômeno 
da federalização no âmbito mais específico do Direito Penal, 
afirmando que, nessa seara, os réus têm direito a recorrer às 
cortes federais sempre que algum dano que lhe for causado 
com fundamento em norma estadual, violando uma norma 
federal. Por fim, conclui que, apesar de alguns problemas 
Abstract
The present article aims to analyze the judicial federalism in 
the United States. To do so, it compares the jurisdiction and the 
autonomy of the federal and states courts, concluding that the 
model adopted in the Judiciary is similar to that followed by the 
Executive and Legislative branches. Furthermore, it analyzes 
the federalization of Criminal Law, affirming that, in this field, 
the defendants have the right to appeal to federal courts every 
time that some damage has been caused to them based on a 
state law, violating a federal law. By the end, it concludes that, 
despite the existence of some endemic and periodical prob-
lems, the American system of judicial federalism has largely 
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 2, n. 3, p. 7-34, set./dez. 2015.
G. Alan Tarr
8 
endêmicos e periódicos, o sistema americano de federalis-
mo judicial obteve considerável sucesso na promoção de 
uniformidade nacional e diversidade subnacional na admi-
nistração da justiça.
Palavras-chave: federalismo judicial; Poder Judiciário; Cor-
tes estaduais e federais; Direito Penal; Estados Unidos. 
succeeded in promoting national uniformity and subnational 
diversity in the administration of justice.
Keywords: judicial federalism; Judicial branch; federal and 
states courts; Criminal Law; United States.
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1. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL FED-
ERALISM
To choose federalism is to choose complexity in government.  Having multiplied 
the number of governments, a federal democracy must provide for the allocation of 
power and responsibility among them, and it must devise mechanisms and procedures 
for resolving disagreements and settling boundary conflicts.  Whereas the component 
units of all federal systems exercise legislative and executive power, many federations 
— for example, Austria, Canada, and India — have not instituted complete sets of 
courts at both the federal and component-unit levels. The United States, in contrast, 
has fifty-one court systems, fifty state and one federal, each with the full panoply of trial 
and appellate courts. The federal government determines the structure and operation 
of the federal courts, and each of the fifty states determines the structure and operation 
of its own courts. Federal law primarily determines the division of authority between 
these court systems.
Under British rule, the thirteen American colonies operated their own systems of 
courts, and the states continued to do so after independence. The federal Constitution 
presupposes the continued existence and operation of state courts: Article IV requires 
that “full faith and credit…be given in each State to the …judicial Proceedings of every 
other State,” thus regulating horizontal judicial federalism, and Article VI mandates that 
“the Judges in every State shall be bound” to recognize the supremacy of federal law, 
thus regulating vertical judicial federalism.2
2  U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 1, and Art. VI, sec. 2.
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Beyond that, the Constitution itself created only a single federal court, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court. It vested the Supreme Court with a very limited original ju-
risdiction and an appellate jurisdiction that encompasses all cases under the federal 
judicial power, “with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as Congress shall 
make.”3 Congress was authorized to create additional federal courts and to invest them 
with portions of the federal judicial power, an invitation that it immediately accepted 
in the Judiciary Act of 1789. However, the Constitution did not mandate that the fed-
eral judicial power be exercised only by the federal courts, and in fact the Judiciary Act 
granted only a limited jurisdiction to the federal courts, with cases outside that jurisdic-
tion (but within the federal judicial power) being resolved by state courts. Despite the 
expansion of the jurisdiction of the federal courts over time, even today federal courts 
do not comprehensively or exclusively exercise the federal judicial power.
Furthermore, the federal judicial power granted in Article III encompasses only 
a small proportion of all legal disputes. The absence of a comprehensive judicial power 
vested in the federal courts necessitates that there be state courts to resolve those dis-
putes that fall outside of the federal judicial power. Cases that are exclusively matters 
for state courts include cases arising from the violation of state criminal statutes (more 
than ninety-five percent of criminal prosecutions occur in state courts) and suits be-
tween citizens of the same state when only state law is implicated. The decision not to 
grant a comprehensive judicial power to the federal government is consistent with the 
overall constitutional design, which established a federal government of limited, dele-
gated powers rather than one with plenary powers.  The Tenth Amendment confirmed 
that this was the aim, emphasizing that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution” were “reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
Although the U.S. Constitution contemplated that each state would have its 
own court system, it did not prescribe the structure and operation of state courts, 
aside from the broad general strictures that the federal government was to guarantee 
to each state a “republican form of government”4 and, with the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment, that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without the due process of law.”5 The former provision, the so-called Guarantee Clause, 
has never been used as a basis for intervening against state courts, although some op-
ponents of judicial elections have speculated that they impinge on the rule of law and 
thus are incompatible with republican government.6 This is at best a dubious proposi-
tion. The Due Process Clause has been used by the U.S. Supreme Court to strike down 
3  U.S. Constitution, Art. III, sec. 2, para. 2.
4  U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 4.
5  U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, sec. 1.
6  FROHNMEYER, David B.; LINDE, Hans A. State Court Responsibility for Maintaining ‘Republican Government’: 
An Amicus Curiae Brief. Willamette Law Review, Salem, vol. 39, n. 1, oct./dec. 2003, p. 1487-1505.
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numerous rulings by state courts, but its impact has extended only to overturning ju-
dicial decisions.7 It has not led to federal legislation affecting the structure or operation 
of state courts. Rather, the design and operation of state court systems continues to be 
determined by state statutes and state constitutions.
2. THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION
2.1.  The Federal Judicial Power
Whether a particular case falls within the federal judicial power conferred by 
Article III of the Constitution is determined by who the parties to the case are (e.g., “Cas-
es affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls”) and/or by the subject 
matter of the case (e.g. “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, 
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made under their 
Authority”). The specific grants of federal judicial power point to four basic purposes 
the federal judiciary is meant to serve. First, federal courts serve to vindicate the au-
thority of the federal government.  To that end, they are empowered to hear cases aris-
ing under the laws of the United States, cases arising under the U.S. Constitution, and 
cases in which the federal government is a party. Second, federal courts ensure the 
exclusive control of the federal government over foreign affairs.  For that purpose, they 
are given the power to hear admiralty and maritime cases, cases arising under treaties, 
cases involving ambassadors, or other representatives of foreign countries, and cases 
between states (or the citizens thereof ) and foreign nations, citizens, or subjects.  Third, 
federal courts umpire interstate disputes, hearing controversies between two or more 
states and controversies between a state and a citizen of another state.  Finally, federal 
courts protect out-of-state litigants from the possible bias of state tribunals, hearing 
cases involving citizens of different states (the federal courts’ “diversity-of-citizenship” 
jurisdiction).
Limitations on the federal judicial power derive both from the separation of 
powers and from federalism. With regard to the former, Article III’s restriction of the 
federal courts to “cases or controversies” is crucial.  This justiciability limitation, rooted 
in the common-law understanding of courts as forums for dispute resolution, means 
that federal courts can only address issues when they are presented in the form of a 
real conflict of legal interests or rights between contending parties.  To bring a case in 
federal court, a party must have standing to sue, that is, he or she must “allege personal 
injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be 
7  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment became the basis by which the U.S. Supreme Court 
has applied the protections of the Bill of Rights against state violations. See ROSSUM, Ralph A.; TARR, G. Alan. 
American Constitutional Law: Volume II - The Bill of Rights and Subsequent Amendments. 9th ed. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 2013. p. 54-59.
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redressed by the requested relief.”8 The requirement of a personal injury largely excludes 
taxpayer suits or suits by individuals as private attorneys general seeking to vindicate 
constitutional values.9 Federal courts also cannot address “political questions,” under-
stood as cases that would “involve inappropriate interference in the business of the 
other branches of government.”10  Among the issues understood as political questions 
are those that the Constitution has committed to other branches for resolution, such 
as impeachment, and those for which there are no “judicially discoverable or manage-
able [legal] standards” or which require “an initial policy determination of a kind clearly 
for nonjudicial discretion,” such as most issues in foreign affairs.11 Finally, the case or 
controversy requirement precludes federal courts from addressing hypothetical issues, 
rendering advisory opinions, or ruling on the constitutionality of proposed legislation 
before its enactment.
A further limit on the federal judicial power flows from the federal character of 
the system of government created by the Constitution and from the states’ status as 
constituent units of that system.  According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the federal ju-
dicial power does not extend to suits against states without their consent, because the 
states enjoy sovereign immunity. Therefore, even in the exercise of its constitutionally 
granted powers, Congress cannot invade the sovereign immunity of states by autho-
rizing suits against them in federal or state courts.  In a series of cases dating from the 
mid-1990s, the Supreme Court has strictly limited the power of Congress to abrogate 
the sovereign immunity of states, striking down several federal statutes that did so.  In 
the first of these cases, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (1996), Chief Justice Rehnquist 
relied primarily on the Eleventh Amendment as the constitutional basis for invalidating 
a congressional effort to abrogate sovereign immunity.12 In subsequent cases the Court 
held that the states’ immunity from suit “is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty 
which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution” and is “confirm[ed] 
by the Tenth Amendment.”13 Whatever the constitutional basis, the result is that the 
8  Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
9  The notion that federal courts are prohibited from hearing cases involving “generalized grievances” is elabo-
rated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).  On the restriction on taxpayer suits, see Frothingham 
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). For a general overview, see ROSSUM, Ralph 
A.; TARR, G. Alan. American Constitutional Law: Volume I – The Structure of Government. 9th ed. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 2013. Chapter 3.
10  United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990).
11  See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), and Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
12  Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).  The Eleventh Amendment, adopted in 1798, reads: “The 
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced 
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any 
Foreign State.”
13  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999). Cases following the Court’s lead in Alden include: Kimmel v. Board 
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Carrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); and Federal 
Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Port Authority, 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
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states’ sovereign immunity operates as a check on the exercise of the federal judicial 
power.
2.2.  Federal Jurisdiction
The Constitution defines the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, i.e., 
the range of cases that it hears as a court of first instance, and Congress can neither 
add to nor subtract from the original jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution.  An 
attempt by Congress to add to the Court’s original jurisdiction became the basis for the 
Supreme Court’s initial invalidation of a congressional statute in the celebrated case 
of Marbury v. Madison.14 Beyond that, the Constitution leaves it to Congress to define 
the jurisdiction of the various federal courts, that is, what portion of the federal judicial 
power each will exercise.  Congress has assigned criminal cases arising under federal 
statutes exclusively to federal courts.  It has also made federal jurisdiction exclusive 
with regard to certain issues that demand national uniformity, such as patents, copy-
rights, and suits against the federal government.  But it has allowed state trial courts 
to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with federal district (trial) courts in most civil cases 
arising under the federal judicial power.15 Thus, with only a few exceptions, civil cases 
that could be filed in federal court can be initiated in state courts as well. Even when 
the party initiating the case chooses state court, if the case was one that could have 
been brought in federal court, the defendant may “remove” the case to federal court. 
This enables lawyers to choose to contest a case in the court in which they believe they 
have the best chance of winning.  Also, throughout the nation’s history Congress has 
limited the jurisdiction of federal courts. In “diversity of citizenship” cases, for example, 
the Constitution permits federal courts to be assigned all cases involving a suit by a 
citizen of one state against the citizen of another state, Congress restricts federal courts 
to cases in which at least $75,000 is at stake.
Although federal jurisdiction might seem a technical concern, it has generated 
intense, if episodic, political conflict for more than two centuries.16 After the adoption 
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, during the nation’s first century, conflicts over federal ju-
risdiction centered largely on questions of federalism.  Nationalists in Congress sought 
to enlarge federal jurisdiction, while champions of states’ rights attempted to maintain 
the prerogatives of state courts, assuming that those courts would adopt a more local-
istic perspective. The first major expansion of federal jurisdiction occurred after the Civil 
14  Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
15  Note the use of the word “allow”: because Congress does not assign jurisdiction to state courts; state courts 
hear all cases not assigned to the federal courts exclusively.
16  See REDISH, Martin H. Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power. Indianapolis: 
Michie, 1980.
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War (1861-1865).  Congress suspected, with good reason, that state courts in the South 
would be unwilling to vindicate the rights of newly freed slaves; so to ensure that those 
rights were protected, it expanded the jurisdiction of the federal courts.  The Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1867 enabled all persons in custody “in violation of the constitution, or 
of any treaty or law of the United States” to seek redress in federal court.  This in effect 
authorized federal courts to oversee state courts in criminal cases to ensure that defen-
dants were not imprisoned in violation of federal law.  The Judiciary Act of 1875 con-
ferred on the federal courts jurisdiction in all cases involving questions of federal law 
and in all diversity cases where more than $500 was at stake. This grant of jurisdiction 
over “federal question” cases ensured that all those who believed their federal rights 
had been infringed could get a hearing before a federal judge.  Since the adoption of 
this Act, the growth in the business of the federal courts has been due largely to new 
congressional legislation, which has created new “federal questions.” For example, the 
adoption of the Volstead Act in 1920 to enforce Prohibition more than doubled the 
criminal prosecutions in federal courts, and the enactment of civil rights statutes in the 
1960s dramatically increased racial discrimination cases in federals courts.
Since the late nineteenth century, changes in federal jurisdiction have reflected 
either congressional dissatisfaction with judicial decisions or a concern to relieve the 
caseload pressures on the federal courts. An example of the former is a statute enacted 
in 1914 that empowered the U.S. Supreme Court to review all state rulings that relied on 
federal law.  (Previously the court could only review state court rulings upholding state 
statutes against federal constitutional challenges.) Congress’s action was a response 
to Ives v. South Buffalo Railway (1911), in which New York’s Supreme Court had ruled 
that the state’s workmen’s compensation act (the first in the nation) violated the fed-
eral Constitution.17 Because most members of Congress favored such legislation and 
believed it to be constitutional, they wanted the Supreme Court to be able to overturn 
excessive constraints placed on state legislatures by state courts.
In recent decades, political conservatives in Congress have responded to con-
troversial federal court decisions by proposing legislation to restrict the power of those 
courts to rule on particular issues.  During the 1970s and 1980s, conservatives intro-
duced bills that would have prohibited lower federal courts from ruling on abortion, 
school prayer, and busing of students to achieve racial integrations in public schools. 
None of these bills was adopted.  Following the election of Republican majorities in 
both houses of Congress in 1994, however, less drastic restrictions on federal jurisdic-
tion were approved.  In 1995, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which 
reduced the discretion of federal courts in supervising prisons and requiring the early 
release of prisoners, and the Effective Death Penalty Act, which limited the power of 
17  Ives v. South Buffalo Railway, 201 N.Y. 271 (1911).
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federal courts to consider successive habeas corpus petitions filed by inmates awaiting 
execution.
Some commentators, including former Chief Justice Rehnquist, have proposed 
further reducing the caseloads of federal courts by eliminating their diversity-of-citi-
zenship jurisdiction. Proponents of this change insist that state courts today treat res-
idents and non-residents even handedly, and so the original justification for the diver-
sity jurisdiction (avoiding possible bias against non-residents in state courts) no longer 
exists.  Shifting diversity cases to state courts would significantly reduce federal case-
loads, as diversity-of-citizenship cases account for more than twenty percent of all civil 
cases filed in federal district courts. However, the American Bar Association and various 
trial lawyers’ organizations have opposed this change, maintaining that federal courts 
do a better job than do state courts in dispensing justice. This dispute sparked a lively 
exchange in legal publications debating the “parity” of federal courts and state courts.18
Whatever the merits of the competing arguments, those seeking to maintain 
diversity jurisdiction have thus far blocked its elimination.
3. THE STATE JUDICIAL POWER AND JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
3.1.  The Division of Authority
Three legal principles govern the relations between federal and state courts in 
their exposition and interpretation of federal and state law.  The first principle is the 
supremacy of federal law.  Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, all 
inconsistencies between federal and state law are to be resolved in favor of the federal 
law, as long as the federal government is acting within the sphere of its authority.  Thus, 
the federal Constitution, federal statutes, and federal administrative regulations all su-
persede state enactments, including state constitutions.  A second principle is the au-
thority of each system of courts to expound its own body of law.  State courts must not 
only give precedence to federal law over state law, they must also interpret the federal 
law in line with current rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court.  Conversely, in interpreting 
the law of a state, federal courts are bound to accept as authoritative the interpretation 
of that law propounded by the highest court of that state.  A third principle is the so-
called autonomy principle: when a case raises issues of both federal and state law, the 
U.S. Supreme Court will not review a ruling grounded in state law unless the ruling is 
inconsistent with federal law.  Thus, when a state ruling rests on “adequate and inde-
pendent state grounds,” it is immune from review by the U.S. Supreme Court.
18  See, for example, NEUBORNE, Burt. The Myth of Parity. Harvard Law Review, New Haven, vol. 90, n. 6, apr. 
1977, p. 1105-1131; and BATOR, Paul. The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, William & Mary 
Law Review, Williamsburg, vol. 22, n. 4, ago./oct. 1981, p. 605-638.
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3.2.  State Judicial Power
Because all residual powers under the federal Constitution lie with the states, the 
state judicial power extends to all cases that do not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the federal courts.  This encompasses most legal disputes.  Moreover, in determining 
what constitutes a “case” appropriate for judicial resolution, the states are not bound by 
the justiciability limitations imposed on federal courts by Article III of the federal Consti-
tution.  Rather, state constitutions and state statutes determine what sorts of claims can 
be litigated in state courts.  Thus, whereas federal law imposes strict standing-to-sue 
requirements, many states have been far more liberal in awarding standing, with most 
permitting taxpayers’ suits to challenge state or municipal government action. Simi-
larly, whereas federal courts cannot issue advisory opinions, seven state constitutions 
expressly impose on their supreme courts a duty to render such opinions, usually upon 
request by the legislature or the executive.  In two other states, courts have upheld stat-
utes permitting advisory opinions even in the absence of constitutional authorization, 
and in North Carolina the power to issue advisory opinions has been established by 
judicial decision.19
Justice William Brennan, who served on the New Jersey Supreme Court before 
his elevation to the U.S. Supreme Court, once observed that “the composite work of 
the courts in the fifty states probably has greater significance [than that of the U.S. Su-
preme Court] in measuring how well America attains the ideal of equal justice for all.”20 
In part this reflects the sheer volume of cases that American state courts decide annu-
ally.  But in addition, the decisions that state courts render tend to have a more direct 
and immediate impact on the daily lives of ordinary citizens than do most rulings of 
federal courts.  More than ninety-five percent of criminal cases are state cases, arising 
under state criminal laws. Family matters (divorce, child custody, and adoption) and 
landlord-tenant relations are regulated by state law and addressed by state courts.  So, 
too, are traffic violations, creditor-debtor disputes, most personal injury suits, and most 
commercial transactions. Such issues not only arise in state courts but also are settled 
by them. Although some state judicial decisions are subject to review by the federal 
courts, most fall outside the federal judicial power—that is, they resolve disputes un-
der state law between citizens of the same state.  Even when the U.S. Supreme Court 
might in theory review state rulings, the sheer number of state cases means that only 
a miniscule percentage receive federal judicial scrutiny, so state courts render the final 
determinative decision in almost all the cases they consider.
19  Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and South Dakota provide for ad-
visory opinions by constitutional mandate, Alabama and Delaware by statute, and North Carolina by court 
decision.
20  BRENNAN JR, William J. State Supreme Court Judges versus United States Supreme Court Justice: A Change 
in Function and Perspective. University of Florida Law Review, Gainesville, vol. 19, 1996. p. 236.
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3.3.  The New Judicial Federalism
The most significant recent development involving the exercise of state judicial 
power was the emergence in the early 1970s of the new judicial federalism, that is, state 
courts relying on state bills of rights to provide greater protection than was available 
under the federal Bill of Rights.21 The development of the new judicial federalism origi-
nated in response to changes in personnel on the U.S. Supreme Court, best symbolized 
by the appointment in 1969 of Warren Burger to succeed Earl Warren as chief justice. 
These personnel changes alarmed civil-liberties advocates, who expected that the re-
constituted Supreme Court would erode the gains they had made during the Warren 
Court era, particularly with regards to the rights of defendants in criminal cases. As it 
turned out, these fears were largely exaggerated, but they led civil-liberties groups to 
look for alternative means to safeguard rights, a search that led them eventually to em-
brace state bills of rights.
The decision to rely on state courts and state bills of rights was rather sur-
prising. State bills of rights protect many of the same set of fundamental rights—
the freedoms of speech and of the press, religious liberty, and protections for de-
fendants—found in the federal Bill of Rights.  Moreover, historically state courts had 
not been aggressive in enforcing those guarantees, which was one of the reasons 
that civil-liberties groups in the past had sought to pursue their claims in federal 
courts. Nevertheless, several factors made these state bills of rights attractive to 
rights advocates in the early 1970s. First of all, state judges interpreting state bills 
of rights are not obliged to conform their interpretations to the rulings of federal 
courts interpreting analogous federal provisions. Even when the language is iden-
tical or nearly identical, state judges are interpreting a unique document, with a 
unique history, and this uniqueness may justify a different interpretation.  More-
over, even if the federal courts have interpreted an identical constitutional provi-
sion in a nearly identical case, as a matter of law the federal ruling is not binding—
states are the ultimate interpreters of their own constitutions, and they may simply 
disagree. They need not assume that the federal interpretation is the best legal 
interpretation.  In addition, under the legal doctrine of “adequate and independent 
state grounds,” rulings based solely on state law are not subject to federal scruti-
ny.22 This means that expansive state rulings, if based on the rights guarantees in 
state constitutions, are insulated from review and reversal by the Supreme Court. 
Thus, the shift to state bills of rights represented a tactical maneuver by groups 
21  On the development of the new judicial federalism and its impact, see TARR, G. Alan. The New Judicial Feder-
alism in Perspective. Notre Dame Law Review, Notre Dame, vol. 72, n. 4, may 1997, p. 1097-1118.
22  Key cases developing the notion of “independent and adequate state grounds” include Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 
U.S. 117 (1945), and Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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eager to evade what they perceived as a less hospitable federal constitutional law. 
From 1950 to 1969, in only ten cases did state judges rely on state guarantees of 
rights to afford greater protection than was available under the federal Constitu-
tion.  But since then they have done so in more than 1200 cases.
The new judicial federalism may have begun as an attempt to circumvent con-
servative decisions of the Supreme Court, but over time its character has changed. 
Initially, the new judicial federalism was confined to a few pioneering courts, but by 
now reliance on state bills of rights had become standard practice in all state courts. 
Initially, the agenda of the new judicial federalism was determined in reaction to or in 
anticipation of rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court on issues such as the rights of defen-
dants and the financing of public education, but that too has changed.  State courts 
continue to address such issues, but they likewise confront new issues that have been 
addressed rarely or not at all by the Supreme Court. For example, the supreme courts in 
a number of states have considered state constitutional challenges to changes in tort 
law, and several also addressed issues involving the rights of gays and lesbians.  State 
constitutional law is thus increasingly becoming an independent body of law rather 
than a body of law defined by its relation to federal constitutional law. This is reflected 
in the highly sophisticated literature on the distinctive problems of state constitutional 
interpretation that has developed in recent years.23
From a theoretical perspective, under the American system of rights pro-
tection, the federal government provides the base, the constitutional minimum, 
ensuring the protection of fundamental rights, while state protections build upon 
that base, providing whatever additional protections the citizens of the state deem 
appropriate. From an institutional perspective, the logic is slightly different. The ini-
tial responsibility for protecting rights often rests with the states, both their political 
branches and their courts.  Federal intervention usually occurs as a result of litiga-
tion, when the states have failed to meet their responsibilities.  This offers substantial 
opportunity for state courts to develop independently their own bodies of civil-lib-
erties law, and they have authored pioneering rulings involving the death penalty, 
the rights of defendants, the financing of public education, the rights of gays and 
lesbians, and several other matters.24
23  See WILLIAMS, Robert F. The Brennan Lecture: Interpreting State Constitutions as Unique Legal Documents. 
Oklahoma City University Law Review, Oklahoma, vol. 27,  mar./may 2002, p. 189-229.
24  For an overview of state civil-liberties rulings under the new judicial federalism, see FRIESEN, Jennifer. State 
Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual Rights, Claims and Defenses. 4th ed. Charlottesville: LexisNexis, 2006.
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4. THE FEDERAL COURTS
4.1.  Development
Congressional statutes have defined and then redefined the federal court sys-
tem.25 The Judiciary Act of 1789 established a Supreme Court of six justices and provid-
ed for two sets of federal trial courts, the thirteen district courts and the three circuit 
courts. A district court was established in each state, staffed by a single district judge, 
exercising a limited jurisdiction involving such matters as revenue, admiralty, and mi-
nor crimes.  The other trial courts, the circuit courts, were likewise geographically based. 
They initially had no judges of their own, but operated in multi-judge panels consisting 
of the district judge for the district and one or both of the Supreme Court justices who 
“rode circuit” (literally traveled from place to place) to hear cases. Beginning in the early 
nineteenth century, Congress multiplied the number of districts, creating new districts 
as new states were admitted to the union and dividing existing states into more than 
one district.  In dividing states into multiple districts, Congress did not act on the basis 
of a general plan but rather proceeded in piecemeal fashion, state by state, typically re-
sponding to the urgings of local groups that were eager to have courts that were more 
convenient geographically.
After the Civil War the expansion of federal jurisdiction, the increase in the num-
ber of judicial districts and circuits, and growth in the caseloads of the federal courts all 
caused the U.S. Supreme Court—at that point the only federal appellate court—to be 
inundated with appeals.  Litigants as a result had to wait as long as three years to have 
their cases heard.  To alleviate this backlog, Congress in 1891 created Circuit Courts of 
Appeals to hear appeals from the District Courts and Circuit Courts. In 191l Congress 
eliminated the Circuit Courts, vesting the original jurisdiction of those courts in the 
District Courts, thus finalized the three-tiered structure of the federal court system that 
exists today.
In addition to the courts already described, Congress has since 1855 created a 
number of specialized federal courts.  In some instances these courts were designed to 
relieve Congress from deciding individually large numbers of similar claims, thus free-
ing Congress to devote its attention to legislation.  This was the rationale for the cre-
ation in 1855 of the Court of Claims (now the U.S. Court of Federal Claims) to hear suits 
against the federal government for monetary damages—e.g., claims for tax refunds 
and for compensation for federal takings of private property for public use.  In other 
instances specialized courts were created because it was important to ensure a uniform 
25  Our account of the development of the federal judicial system relies on FALLON, Richard. Hart and 
Wechsler’s The Federal Courts in the Federal System. 4th ed. Westbury: Foundation Press, 1996; and REDISH, 
Martin H. Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power. Indianapolis: Michie, 1980.
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to ensure uniform resolution of issues arising under federal statues of national applica-
tion.  Thus the U.S. Customs Court, located in New York City, hears cases arising out of 
civil rulings by U.S. customs collectors involving the amount of customs duties, the val-
ue of imported goods, and the exclusion of merchandise from the country. Specialized 
courts may also be created, sometimes merely temporarily, to address problems arising 
from a particular emergency.  Thus the Alien Terrorist Removal Court was established 
in the wake of the bombing of the federal office building in Oklahoma City in 1996, in 
order to streamline the deportation of criminal aliens after they had served their prison 
sentences.  Finally, some specialized courts have been established to deal with high-
ly sensitive matters—for example, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (1978) 
oversees the issuance of warrants to use electronic eavesdropping to acquire “foreign” 
intelligence within the United States.
4.2.  Current Structure
Congress has established ninety-four district courts, staffed by 663 judges (as of 
October, 2015), serving the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and territories (e.g., the 
Virgin Islands) governed by the United States. Every state has at least one district court, 
and no district extends beyond the borders of a single state.  Larger or more populous 
states are divided into more than one district, with three states—California, New York, 
and Texas—each having four district courts. Every district court has at least two judges: 
the number of judges assigned to a district court depends on its caseload, and that var-
ies considerably from district to district. District courts exercise no discretion over what 
cases they hear.  Any litigant who satisfies the jurisdictional requirements and follows 
proper legal procedures can initiate a case in federal district court. However, a federal 
district court cannot address a legal issue unless a litigant brings it before the court in 
a bona fide case.  Thus, the business of the district courts is determined solely by the 
litigant demand. Over the past few decades, the filings in federal district courts have 
risen sharply: from 87,421 cases in 1960 to 390,525 cases in 2014.26 Civil filings have 
increased during these decades, but the more substantial increase has been in federal 
criminal cases.  The increase in criminal cases reflects both the rising number of drug 
cases now prosecuted in federal courts and congressional enactment of legislation cre-
ating new federal crimes. Only about 15 percent of district court rulings get appealed, 
so federal district courts render the final decision in most federal court cases.
Congress has established thirteen federal courts of appeals, staffed by 179 judg-
es, that serve as the first-level appellate courts of the federal judicial system.  In more 
than ninety-five percent of the cases they hear, courts of appeals meet in three-judge 
26 Federal Court Caseload Statistics, at http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-case-
load-statistics-2014 .
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panels, deciding cases by majority vote; but federal statutes also permit courts of ap-
peals at their discretion to hear cases en banc, with the entire membership of the court 
deciding a case.  More than three-quarters of the cases decided by courts of appeals 
come on appeal from the district courts, with the remainder coming from federal ad-
ministrative agencies or from specialized courts, such as the Tax Court. Twelve of the 
thirteen courts of appeals are organized regionally.  Eleven have “circuits” made up of 
three or more states and/or territories—for example, the First Circuit includes Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and the Virgin Islands, and the Seventh Circuit in-
cludes Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.  One court of appeals, the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia, reviews large numbers of appeals from federal administrative 
agencies and serves as a sort of state supreme court for the District of Columbia. The 
thirteenth court of appeals, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, was created in 
1982 by combining the jurisdictions of the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
and the U.S. Court of Claims into a single court.
The boundaries of most regional circuits were established long ago, and as pop-
ulation shifts have occurred, some courts of appeals have experienced disproportion-
ate increases in their caseloads.  In 1981 Congress responded to caseload pressures 
by splitting the old Fifth Circuit into a new Fifth Circuit (serving Texas, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi) and a new Eleventh Circuit (serving Alabama, Georgia, and Florida). Gener-
ally, however, Congress’s response to burgeoning caseloads has been to add judges to 
overburdened circuits, and as a result the number of judges varies considerably among 
the courts of appeals.  The First Circuit has the fewest appeals court judges (6), while the 
Ninth Circuit has the most (26).
Atop the federal judicial hierarchy sits the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Its nine justices receive more than 7,000 petitions for review each year, primarily from 
federal courts of appeals and state supreme courts, and in recent years the justices have 
decided fewer than 80 cases annually.27 Over the course of the twentieth century, Con-
gress gradually expanded the justices’ control over their agenda, so that today they 
exercise virtually complete discretion in determining which appeals to hear and which 
to reject.  The legal or political importance of the issue, the lower courts’ rulings on the 
issue, the parties to the case, and the justices’ own legal views all factor into the deci-
sion to grant or deny certiorari.
27  This of course means that a very large proportion of decisions by federal courts of appeals and by state 
supreme courts are not reviewed by the Supreme Court. When the Supreme Court does not review a ruling 
by a court of appeals or state supreme court, then that ruling is the final and determinative ruling in the case.
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5. STATE COURTS
5.1.  Structure
State court systems typically involve a hierarchy of courts. Atop the state court 
system is the state supreme court. Forty-eight states vest ultimate appellate authority 
in a single court, usually designated as the Supreme Court (although Maryland and 
New York call their highest court the Court of Appeals and Maine and Massachusetts 
designate it the Supreme Judicial Court). Oklahoma and Texas have each established 
both a Court of Criminal Appeals, which is the court of last resort in criminal cases, 
and a Supreme Court, which has final responsibility for appeals in civil cases. The state 
supreme court is responsible for the development of state law, and its decisions serve 
as authoritative precedent within the state court system. Its jurisdiction is defined by 
the state constitution, by state statutes, or by both.  Usually, a state supreme court does 
not enjoy the broad discretion over the cases it hears that the U.S. Supreme Court does. 
The mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the Washington Supreme Court, for example, 
includes certain criminal, administrative agency, juvenile, and lawyer-discipline cases. 
Not surprisingly, given their more extensive mandatory jurisdiction, most state su-
preme courts decide more cases per year than does the United States Supreme Court.
Forty states have also created intermediate courts of appeals — that is, first-lev-
el appellate courts below the state supreme court.  These courts focus on error correc-
tion.  They review the rulings of state trial courts to ensure that the judges did not make 
errors in procedure or in the interpretation of the law that would warrant reversal of 
their decisions, and — like the federal courts of appeals — these courts exercise no dis-
cretion over the appeals that they hear. If an appeal is properly filed, they must review 
the lower court’s decision. Decisions of an intermediate court of appeals typically can 
be appealed to the state supreme court, though state law may allow the supreme court 
some discretion over what cases it chooses to review.  In practice, intermediate courts 
of appeals render the final decision in most cases that come before them.
Intermediate courts of appeals were initially established in populous state to 
alleviate case load pressures on state supreme courts, but now most states have also 
created intermediate courts of appeals.  There is wide variation in the structure and 
operation of these courts. Some sparsely populated states — for example, Alaska — 
have a single court that hears all appeals en banc. Other states, such as California and 
Louisiana, have followed the model of the federal courts of appeals, with several courts 
serving various regions of the state. These courts typically meet in three-judge panels, 
just like the federal courts of appeals. In contrast, Alabama and Tennessee have created 
separate courts for appeals in criminal cases and in civil cases.
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Four states—Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and South Dakota—have a single set 
or original jurisdiction (trial) courts. Forty-six states, however, operate two sets of trial 
courts: courts of limited jurisdiction and courts of general jurisdiction. Courts of limited 
jurisdiction go under a variety of names: municipal court, county court, district court, 
justice of the peace court, and so on.  They handle less serious criminal cases and civ-
il cases involving relatively small sums of money.  For example, North Carolina’s trial 
courts of limited jurisdiction, known as district courts, decide civil cases involving less 
than $10,000, domestic relations cases, and criminal cases involving juvenile offenders 
or misdemeanors.  In contrast, courts of general jurisdiction handle more important 
civil cases and serious criminal cases. In several states they may also hear appeals, of-
ten with a new trial (called a trial de novo) from courts of limited jurisdiction. (A new 
trial is necessary because limited jurisdiction courts do not keep a verbatim record of 
proceedings.)
Despite some basic uniformities, what is most striking about state court systems 
is their bewildering organizational diversity.  No two state court systems are exactly the 
same.  Perhaps the most important variation is found in the organization of state trial 
courts.  Although forty-six states divide original jurisdiction between courts of limited 
jurisdiction and courts of general jurisdiction, most further subdivide it on the basis of 
geography, subject matter, or both.  Distinctive courts reflect the history or economy of 
the state.  Thus, Maryland has a separate Orphan’s Court; Colorado has a Water Court; 
and New York has ten separate sets of trial courts, including special civil and criminal 
courts for New York City.
5.2.  Development and Reform
Historical factors largely account for the organizational complexity found in 
state court systems.  In creating their court systems, most states designed them to serve 
a relatively sparse and predominantly rural citizenry.  Over time, urbanization, popu-
lation growth, and the developing complexity of the law produced new demands for 
court services.  In some states constitutional amendments were adopted to modernize 
the court system, but often these amendments were outpaced by subsequent devel-
opment, requiring periodic changes.  In other states the legislatures responded not by 
overhauling the existing court structure but by creating additional trial courts to satisfy 
the demands for accessible court services.  Thus, in contrast with the federal court sys-
tem, whose structure has remained relatively stable for the most part, many state court 
systems have exhibited a continuing pattern of demand and response.  Typically, the 
new state trial courts that were created were added with little consideration of their 
impact on the overall coherence of the state judicial system, reflecting no underlying 
organizational principle.
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During the twentieth century, reformers introduced important changes in state 
court systems.  A nationwide reform campaign, spearheaded by the American Judi-
cature Society and the American Bar Association, focused on streamlining state court 
systems. According to these groups the complexities of state court systems — in partic-
ular, the myriad specialized trial courts with their overlapping jurisdictions — interfered 
with the efficient and uniform administration of justice.  Litigants often did not know 
in which court to file suits, and varying procedural requirements from court to court 
meant that cases were too often dismissed on procedural grounds, without consider-
ation of their merits. To remedy these problems, the reformers proposed a consolida-
tion of state trial courts and a clearer definition of the jurisdictional boundaries among 
them.  In the decades following World War II, the reformers’ campaign for trial court 
consolidation enjoyed considerable success.  Once structural changes were introduced 
in a few states, such as New Jersey, other states followed their lead and modernized 
their courts.
Another structural reform, adopted in response to increases in the number of 
appeals filed in state courts, has been the establishment of intermediate courts of ap-
peals.  By itself, this structural change had little effect on the caseload problems of state 
supreme courts. Appeals tended to increase following the establishment of interme-
diate appellate courts, and with appeals from those courts to the state supreme court, 
filings in the supreme court soon approximated earlier levels.28 However, when the cre-
ation of intermediate appellate courts was combined with limitations on the right of a 
second appeal, it substantially reduced the caseloads of state supreme courts.29 Equally 
important was the effect that this reform had on the types of cases coming before state 
supreme courts and on the role that those courts began to play in their states. By di-
verting routine cases away from state supreme courts, intermediate appellate courts 
allowed state supreme courts to devote more attention to cases that raised important 
policy questions and to assume a position of leadership in the legal development of 
their states.
6. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
6.1.  The “Federalization” of Criminal Law
In its unamended form, the United States Constitution expressly authorized 
Congress to make criminal only treason, offenses committed on federal property, 
28  FLANGO, Victor Eugene; BLAIR, Nora F. Creating an Intermediate Appellate Court: Does It Reduce the Case-
load of a State’s Highest Court? Judicature, Durham, vol. 64, aug. 1980, p. 74-84.
29  For examples, see GROOT, Roger D. The Effects of an Intermediate Appellate Court on the Supreme Court 
Work Product: The North Carolina Experience. Wake Forest Law Review, Winston-Salem, vol. 7, 1971, p. 546-
572.
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counterfeiting, offenses against the “Law of Nations,” piracy, and “Felonies committed 
on the high Seas.”30 However, as Chief Justice John Marshall recognized in McCulloch 
v. Maryland, the grants of other powers to Congress, coupled with the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, permit Congress to impose penal sanctions to further the exercise of 
those powers.31 For example, the power to establish post offices carries with it the pow-
er to outlaw mail fraud or theft of the mail, and the power to regulate commerce in-
cludes the power to punish those who violate congressional regulations of commerce. 
Nevertheless, until the Civil War there were relatively few federal crimes, and those 
largely consisted of offenses against the United States, its officers and property, and 
the territory that it ruled directly.  The prosecutions of crimes was generally understood 
as the responsibility of (and province of ) state government, and there was virtually no 
overlap between federal and state crimes.32
After the Civil War, Congress enacted criminal laws to enforce the provisions of 
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, which guaranteed (among 
other things) the rights of the newly freed slaves. From 1870-1970, Congress occasion-
ally adopted criminal legislation to regulate and protect interstate commercial activity, 
which was expanding. With the advent of the automobile, which increased the mobility 
of criminals, enabling them to cross state lines in order to evade state and local law en-
forcement, Congress expanded the federal role, targeting bank robbery, car theft, and 
kidnapping, as well as various forms of organized crime.  Nevertheless, Congress largely 
left ordinary law enforcement in the hands of the states.
This has changed in recent decades: more than half of all the federal criminal 
laws enacted since the Civil War have been enacted since 1970. Much of the recent fed-
eralization of criminal law has been a political response to highly publicized crimes.  For 
example, within a week after the 1999 massacre of students at Columbine High School 
in Colorado, federal legislation was proposed making it a felony for adults to recklessly 
or knowingly allow children to possess weapons later used to injure or kill a person. 
Within weeks after a Maryland woman was brutally murdered during a car-jacking, 
Congress made car-jacking a federal crime. In both these instances—and in many oth-
ers as well—Congress was enacting criminal statutes addressing conduct that had no 
distinctive federal dimension and that was already outlawed by state law.
From the perspective of judicial federalism, the enactment of such duplica-
tive federal legislation raises several concerns. First the federalization of criminal law 
30  U.S. Constitution, Art. I, sec. 8.
31  McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819); U.S. Constitution, Article I, sec. 8, para. 18.
32  This section’s analysis of the federalization of criminal prosecutions relies primarily on MARONEY, Thomas J. 
Fifty Years of Federalization of Criminal Law: Sounding the Alarm or ‘Crying Wolf’. Syracuse Law Review, Syra-
cuse, vol. 50, 2000, p. 1317-1378; and EHRLICH, Susan A. The Increasing Federalization of Crime. Arizona State 
Law Journal, Tempe, vol. 32, sep./nov. 2000, p. 825-842.
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impinges on the historical role of state courts in adjudicating criminal matters. Sec-
ond, the requirement that federal courts address a potentially large volume of run-of-
the-mill criminal cases could prove a drain on federal resources, diverting the federal 
courts from their unique mission of adjudicating important national issues. Third, the 
existence of federal and state statutes, with different penalties for the same offense, 
promotes unequal justice, in that defendants committing the same act may receive 
different sentences depending on whether they are tried in federal or state court, and it 
gives undue discretion to prosecutors in deciding in which forum to prosecute cases.33
Some constitutional scholars claim that much of this federal criminal legislation 
exceeds the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution, and this view has enjoyed 
some support on the U.S. Supreme Court. In United States v. Lopez (1995), a five-mem-
ber Court majority struck down the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act; in United States 
v. Morrison (2000) the same majority invalidated the federal Violence Against Women 
Act; and in Jones v. United States (2000) the Court held that a federal arson statute, if 
applied to arson of an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose, 
would exceed Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.34 Nevertheless, it seems 
unlikely that the Court will be an effective barrier against the federalization of criminal 
law, given the political incentives for federalization and the ability of Congress to frame 
much of its criminal law as necessary and proper to carrying out its power to regulate 
commerce among the several states.
6.2.  Habeas Corpus
Habeas corpus was originally a common law writ designed to test the legality of 
confinement. A writ of habeas corpus is a court order commanding an official, whether 
state or federal, who holds a prisoner in custody to demonstrate to the court the legal 
justification for the restraint of personal liberty. This venerable legal protection, termed 
by Chief Justice Salmon Chase “the best and only sufficient defense of personal free-
dom,” was granted constitutional recognition even before the adoption of the Bill of 
Rights.35 Article I, section 9 of the federal Constitution mandates that the “privilege of 
the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or 
invasion the public safety may require it.”
Because the Constitution did not require the creation of lower federal courts 
that could issue the writ, this provision may initially have been designed to safeguard 
33  See CLYMER, Steven D. Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law. Southern California Law Re-
view, Los Angeles, vol. 70, mar. 1997, p. 643-739.
34  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); and Jones v. United 
States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
35  Ex Parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 95 (1868).
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habeas corpus in state courts against infringement by the federal government. Prior 
to the Civil War, some state courts in “free” states issue writs of habeas corpus releas-
ing persons convicted in federal court of violating the Fugitive Slave Act. However, the 
Supreme Court in Ableman v. Booth (1859) ruled that state courts lacked the power to 
release persons imprisoned following conviction in federal court.36 More recently, ten-
sions over habeas corpus have resulted from its use in federal courts to challenge con-
victions in state courts under state criminal laws, as habeas corpus provides the only 
circumstance in which state court judgments can be reviewed by lower federal courts.
State courts readily concede that they are obliged to uphold federal constitu-
tional requirements in criminal cases. This responsibility has assumed greater impor-
tance since the 1940’s, when the Supreme Court began to expand the range of pro-
cedural requirements on state courts through the “selective incorporation” of various 
guarantees of the federal Bill of Rights, making them equally applicable in state pros-
ecutions.37 State courts likewise acknowledge that their rulings on matters of federal 
constitutional law are subject to appellate review by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Of course, 
given the number of state supreme court rulings and the limited capacity of the Su-
preme Court, this is quite a limited oversight mechanism. In its 2014 term, for example, 
the Supreme Court heard only five appeals from state courts in criminal cases. What has 
created resentment on the part of state courts is the possibility that a single federal dis-
trict court judge may review the determination of a multi-member state supreme court 
and overturn the conviction upheld on appeal by the state’s highest court.
In practice, the overturning of state convictions on habeas corpus review hap-
pens relatively infrequently—one study documented that federal courts granted less 
than one percent of habeas petitions filed by state prisoners.38 Moreover, both Con-
gress and the Supreme Court have undertaken to reduce tensions between state and 
federal courts. Congress has mandated that a state prisoner must exhaust his remedies 
in state court (appeals, state habeas corpus, or other post-conviction remedies) thereby 
allowing state courts an opportunity to correct their own errors, before federal habeas 
corpus can be issued. Finally, at least some legal commentators have argued that the re-
lation between federal and state courts in habeas corpus should be viewed not as one 
of domination but rather one of dialogue, in which the possession of authority does not 
36  Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506 (1859).
37  See ROSSUM, Ralph A.; TARR, G. Alan. American Constitutional Law: Volume II - The Bill of Rights and Sub-
sequent Amendments. 9th ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 2013. Chapter 7.
38  FLANGO, Victor E; MCKENNA, Patricia. Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions. California 
Western Law Review, Riverside, vol. 31, n. 2, mar./may 1995, p. 237-275.
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preclude a willingness to listen and learn and in which the duty of obedience does not 
eliminate all say over how the authority will be exercised.39
6.3.  Certification
Although appellate review serves to ensure that state courts faithfully apply fed-
eral law, there is no analogous procedure for ensuring that federal courts properly inter-
pret state law in the cases coming before them.  In 1967 Florida pioneered a remedy for 
this situation, authorizing its supreme court to rule on questions of state law certified to 
it by either the United State Supreme Court or federal courts of appeals. By 1982 twen-
ty-three other states had followed Florida’s lead by permitting certification questions of 
state law to their respective supreme courts, and in 1983 the American Bar Association 
adopted a resolution urging that all states adopt certification procedures.40 However, 
despite its potential benefits, certification has not been widely employed.  According to 
Guido Calabresi, formerly a distinguished professor at Yale University and later a mem-
ber of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the reason is simple: 
“Federal judges don’t like to certify, because we think we know, better than the states, 
what state law ought to be.”41 Whatever the reasons—and Calabresi argues for a ma-
jor expansion in the use of certification—in its absence state supreme courts have no 
means for reviewing federal courts’ interpretation of state law. On the other hand, they 
are not bound by federal interpretations of state law that they deem erroneous, and by 
their rulings in subsequent cases they can see to correct those errors and guide future 
federal court interpretations. 
6.4.  Cooperative Arrangements
In Federalist No. 82, Alexander Hamilton observed that “the nation and state 
[court] systems are to be regarded as ‘one whole’.” Part of the success of American ju-
dicial federalism stems from efforts designed to make Hamilton’s observation a real-
ity, to facilitate cooperation between the federal and state judiciaries and to develop 
practical mechanisms for promoting the more effective administration of justice.  The 
need to promote a harmonious, cooperative relationship between the federal and state 
judiciaries was highlighted by Chief Justice Warren Burger in 1970 in his state of the 
judiciary address to the American Bar Association. Since then, new institutions have 
39  See COVER, Robert M.; ALEINIKOFF, T. Alexander. Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court. Yale 
Law Journal, New Haven, vol. 86, may 1997, p. 1035-1102.
40  On the perceived success of certification, see SERON, Caroll. Certifying Questions of State Law: Experi-
ence of Federal Judges. Washington DC: Federal Judicial Center, 1983.
41  CALABRESI, Guido. Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance. New York University Law Re-
view, New York, vol. 78, n. 4, oct. 2003, p. 1293-1308.
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been established, numerous studies have been undertaken, and new channels of com-
munication have been opened with the aim of fostering cooperation and upgrading 
court operations.
The creation of the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) in 1971 and the State 
Justice Institute (SJI) in 1984 have probably had the greatest effect on the quality of 
justice in state courts and on coordination and cooperation between state and federal 
courts.  The NCSC was the brainchild of Chief Justice Burger, who saw a need for major 
improvement in many state court systems. The NCSC, which receives a substantial part 
of its funding from grants from the federal government, serves as a clearinghouse for 
information on best practices pioneered in various court systems. In addition, it de-
velops standards to guide state courts, such as its Trial Court Performance Standards, 
and undertakes studies focusing on common problems, such as court backlogs and 
the need to introduce technology to improve productivity in court administration. The 
NCSC also provides expert assistance on request to court systems. Finally, in conjunc-
tion with its counterpart federal institution, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), it encour-
ages cooperation between court systems.
The State Justice Institute was established by federal law as a mechanism for 
awarding project grants designed to improve the quality of justice in state courts, for 
facilitating better communication and coordination between state and federal courts, 
and for fostering innovative solutions to problems faced by all courts. Although SJI is 
fully funded by the federal government, by statute its eleven-member Board of Direc-
tors, appointment by the President and confirmed by the Senate, must include at least 
six state judges, thereby ensuring the SJI remains responsive to state concerns.  Since 
becoming operational in 1987, the SJI has awarded more than $130 million in grants in 
support of more than 1000 projects.
Several other innovative steps have been taken in recent years to foster cooper-
ation between state and federal courts.  State-federal judicial councils were created in 
most states that meet annually to discuss areas of mutual concern.  In 1992, a national 
conference was convened on state-federal judicial relations, and the following year the 
Federal Judicial Center and the National Center for State Courts began publishing the 
State Federal Judicial Observer, a newsletter devoted to state-federal judicial relations 
and activities. Building on that momentum, in 1997 the FJC and NCSC jointly published 
a Manual for Cooperation Between State and Federal Courts that addresses such vital 
matters as calendar conflicts, joint discovery plans, certification of questions of state 
law, and sharing courtroom facilities.
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7. EMERGING AND ENDEMIC ISSUES AFFECTING STATE AND FED-
ERAL COURTS
Federal and state courts face some common problems in their relationships 
with the other branches of government and with the public.  A system of judicial feder-
alism permits different court systems to adopt their own solutions to these problems. 
This section identifies some important instances of this aspect of judicial federalism.
7.1.  Judicial Independence and Accountability
Judicial independence refers to the capacity of judges to render decisions ac-
cording to law without undue external influence or threat of retribution for their deci-
sions.42 Thus judicial independence is perceived as crucial for judicial impartiality—if 
judges are to behave impartially, they must be free from pressures to behave other-
wise. In the United States, however, this concern for judicial impartiality is in tension 
with another deeply held American value: the accountability of governmental officials, 
that is, the notion that in a democratic society citizens should select those who wield 
power and hold them accountable for its exercise.  In the federal courts, the emphasis 
has been on safeguarding judicial independence. Although the emphasis varies among 
state court systems, in general they have been more willing to introduce mechanisms 
for judicial accountability, even at some risk to judicial independence.
The federal Constitution establishes specific guarantees for the independence 
of federal judges. Article III grants federal judges tenure during “good behavior,” so even 
though the selection process for federal judges has grown increasingly partisan and 
contentious in recent decades, federal judges—once appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate—in practice serve until retirement. In only seven instances 
have federal judges been impeached and removed from office, and these cases have 
all involved instances of personal wrongdoing (e.g. bribery, perjury) rather than retri-
bution for unpopular decisions.43 Article III also protects judicial independence by pro-
hibiting the reduction of judges’ salaries during their term in office.  Thus, during the 
Great Depression of the 1930’s, when Congress cut the pay of all other federal officials, 
the Constitution prevented a similar reduction for federal judges.44
State judges enjoy less judicial independence. Most state constitutions safe-
guard judges from punitive salary reductions (although some permit salary reduc-
tions for judges if they are part of an across-the-board reduction for all state officials). 
42  See TARR, G. Alan. Without Fear or Favor: Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability in the States. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012.
43  VOLCANSEK, Mary L. Judicial Impeachment: None Called for Justice. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1993.
44  U.S. Constitution, Art. III, sec. 1.
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With regard to selection and tenure, however, the states tend to emphasize judicial 
accountability to the populace, even at some risk to judicial independence.  In only 
three states—Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire—do judges hold of-
fice during good behavior. Terms of office vary from state to state and also vary among 
courts within a single state, with trial court judges likely to serve shorter terms than 
appellate judges do.  More than half the states prescribe terms of eight years or fewer 
for their supreme court justices.  However, no state imposes term limits on state judges, 
and therefore incumbent judges are eligible to run for reelection, although many states 
do impose a retirement age (usually seventy).
The states employ a variety of means for selecting and retaining judges. In four 
states the governor appoints all appellate judges and in three states all trial judges as 
well, subject to confirmation by the state senate.  This selection system mirrors fed-
eral judicial selection, except that judges do not serve during good behavior. In New 
Jersey, for example, judges serve an initial term of seven years and, if reappointed 
and reconfirmed, serve until the retirement age of seventy.  In Virginia the legislature 
elects state judges, a system that has tended to favor the judicial candidacies of former 
legislators. Nineteen states elect some or all of their judges in non-partisan elections. 
Candidates run for election without party labels, and usually the two top candidates 
in a non-partisan primary election qualify for a runoff in the general election.  Eleven 
states elect some or all of their judges in partisan elections, in which political parties 
nominate candidates for judicial office, and prospective judges run with party labels 
in the general election.  Finally, twenty-three states employ a “merit selection” system, 
in which the governor appoints judges from a list of candidates proposed by a judicial 
nominating commission typically composed of lawyers selected by the state bar asso-
ciation and non-lawyers appointed by the governor.  Even judges selected by this last 
procedure must periodically run for reelection in retention elections, in which voters 
decide whether the judge should remain in office—the ballot reads: Should Judge X 
be retained in office? Altogether, eighty-nine percent of state appellate judges stand 
for election, whether in partisan elections, nonpartisan elections, or retention elections.
Whatever one’s view on the desirability of electing judges, the fact that each 
state remains free to strike its own balance between judicial independence and judicial 
accountability, rather than having to follow the federal lead on this matter, illustrates 
the operation of judicial federalism in the United States. 
7.2.  Judicial Branch Autonomy
The system of separation of powers at both the federal and state levels means that 
each branch will be dependent on the other branches to some extent.  Because, as Alex-
ander Hamilton observed in Federalist #78, the judiciary has “neither the sword nor the 
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purse,” it must rely on the assistance of the legislative and executive branches in carrying 
out its responsibilities.  Lacking the “purse,” it must look to the legislature for the funding 
it needs; lacking the “sword,” it must depend on the executive to enforce its mandates. 
However, the separation of powers also implies that each branch of government, federal 
or state, has a realm in which it operates autonomously.  This realm of autonomy extends 
to a branch’s internal operations—each branch is master in its own house.  Thus, just as 
the Legislature sets its own rules for the transaction of its business, so too the Judiciary 
should set the rules for the transaction of its business.  That, at any rate, is the argument 
for the control of the Judiciary over rules of practice and procedure.
The situation is complicated at the federal level, however, by two factors. First, 
the Constitution gives Congress a general authority over the courts.  It authorizes Con-
gress to make “Regulations” governing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
and to “make all Laws, which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execu-
tion… all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department [including the Judicial Department] or Officer thereof.”45 
Second, Congress retains the power to enact substantive law, and the line between 
substance and procedure may be unclear.
In practice, rather than enacting legislation stipulating the rules of procedure 
that govern proceedings in federal court, Congress has delegated rule-making pow-
er to the courts themselves.  The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 authorized the Supreme 
Court “to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for 
cases in the United States district courts…and courts of appeals.”46 The Supreme Court 
has in turn delegated initial responsibility for drafting proposed rules to an Advisory 
Committee (composed of judges, practicing lawyers, and legal academics appointed 
by the Chief Justice). After the Advisory Committee’s drafts are reviewed, those changes 
approved by the Supreme Court are submitted to Congress. Congress has the power to 
reject, accept, or amend the Court’s proposals during a seven-month “layover” period. 
However, should Congress not act on the rules promulgated by the Court during that 
period, they automatically take effect.
At the state level the constitutional allocation of power for rule-making varies 
from state to state. Some state constitutions expressly vest the power to establish pro-
cedural rules in the Supreme Court. Others expressly vest the power in the Legislature. 
Still others vest the power in the Supreme court but authorize the Legislature to over-
turn rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. Finally, some state constitutions are si-
lent on the matter, leaving it to be worked out through implications from the separa-
tion of powers or the plenary scope of state legislative authority.
45  U.S. Constitution, Art. III, sec. 2, para. 3, and Art. I, sec. 8, para. 18.
46  28 U.S.C. sec. 2072.
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Federal constitutional law plays a significant role in this area. The federal Bill 
of Rights imposes a number of requirements on the operation of federal courts, par-
ticularly with regard to criminal prosecutions. It guarantees defendants a right to 
a speedy and public trial before a jury of their peers. It grants them a right to notice 
of the charges against them, a right to counsel, a right to confront witnesses against 
them, a right to call witnesses on their behalf, and a right against self-incrimination. The 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law and secures to all the equal protection of the laws. 
In enforcing these guarantees, the United States Supreme Court has selectively incor-
porated almost all criminal procedural guarantees of the federal Bill of Rights and has 
applied them equally to the states as to the federal government. For example, Gideon v. 
Wainwright required states to furnish counsel to indigent defendants in criminal cases; 
Mapp v. Ohio ruled that illegally obtained evidence could not be used in state prose-
cutions; and Pointer v. Texas held that state prosecutors could not submit a transcript 
of a witness’s testimony in lieu of his appearance in state court, as that deprived the 
defendant to confront and cross-examine the witness.47 However, states remain free, as 
a matter of state law, to afford additional procedural protections for defendants beyond 
those mandated by the federal Constitution.
8. CONCLUSION
A preeminent federalism scholar, Daniel Elazar, has observed that federalism 
involves both self-rule and shared rule, and the American system of judicial federal-
ism clearly illustrates this.48 Under the American system of judicial federalism, both the 
federal government and state governments have instituted their own court systems. 
To a considerable extent, these sets of courts operate independently of each other. The 
federal government determines the structure of the federal court system, whereas each 
state defines the structure of its own court system. The federal Constitution defines 
the federal judicial power, and the Constitution and congressional statutes together 
allocate jurisdiction among the various federal courts. All judicial power not granted 
to the federal government resides in the states, and state constitutions and state law 
assign that power as they see fit among state courts. The federal Constitution defines 
the mode of selection, tenure, and compensation for federal judges, while state law 
does the same for state judges. Whereas the federal Constitution emphasizes judicial 
independence, state law seeks to balance independence and accountability, with 
47  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v, Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); and Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 
(1965).
48  For an elaboration of his extraordinarily influential views, see ELAZAR, Daniel J. Exploring Federalism. Tus-
caloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987.
Judicial federalism in the United States: structure, jurisdiction and operation
33Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 2, n. 3, p. 7-34, set./dez. 2015.
various states striking the balance quite differently. Federal appropriations finance 
federal courts, while state and local appropriations finance state courts. Finally, each 
set of courts makes the final and determinative ruling in most cases that come before 
it. In particular, more than ninety percent of cases originating in state courts involves 
matters outside the federal judicial power, and thus the rulings in those cases are not 
susceptible to federal court review.
However, when state court cases involve matters of federal law, state courts are 
obliged to give precedence to federal law over state law, when they are in conflict, and 
to interpret the federal law in conformity with authoritative rulings of the United States 
Supreme Court. State court rulings on federal law are subject to appellate review by 
the United States Supreme Court. Moreover, state prisoners can petition federal district 
courts for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the state has violated their rights under 
federal law. Thus, when important national interests are implicated, mechanisms exist 
for promoting national legal uniformity. Thus, despite endemic problems and periodic 
concerns, it is reasonable to conclude that the American system of judicial federalism 
has largely succeeded in promoting both necessary national uniformity and subnation-
al diversity in the administration of justice.
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